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Abstract 
Taking advantage of some of the lessons learned from income 
inequality comparisons over time and/or across space, we provide a 
complete framework of analysis to compare the social or aggregate welfare 
of independent cross-sections of household income and non-income 
household characteristics. This framework serves to clarify a number of 
traditional issues on i) the proper domain of the social evaluation problem; 
iD the need to consider alternative mean invariant inequality notions; iiD 
the decomposition of changes in real welfare into changes of the mean at 
constant prices and changes in real inequality; iv) the nature of the inter­
household welfare comparability assumptions implicit in all empirical 
work, and v) the strong implications of separability assumptions necessary 
for inequality and welfare decomposition by population subgroups. This 
review essay, written with an operational aim in mind, extends and updates 
the treatment found, for example, in Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). The 
main novelty is the analysis of the simplifying implications of the condition 
that income adjustment procedures for taking into account non-income 
needs are independent of household utility levels -an assumption originally 
introduced in the theoretical literature by Lewbel (1989) and Blackorby and 
Donaldson (1989), which is extended here to the absolute case. 
KEY WORDS: welfare; inequality; equivalence scales; decomposition 
by population subgroups 
INTRODUCTION 
In every science, there is no interesting measurement without 
theory. In addition, in the social sciences there is no measurement without 
value judgements. These lessons are well established in many parts of 
economics. In particular, since the seminal work of Atkinson (1970), Kolm 
(1976a, b), and Sen (1973), following up on the classical paper by Dalton 
(1926), the empirical analysis of income distributions belongs to the field of 
welfare or normative economics. 
The value of any empirical piece in this area depends on the data 
available, and on the choice of a conceptual framework within which the 
measurement exercise becomes meaningful. Here, we provide a complete 
framework of analysis to compare the social or aggregate welfare of 
independent cross-sections of household data on total income, 
expenditures in particular commodities, and non-income characteristics. 
In so doing, we will be taking advantage of some of the lessons learned 
from income inequality comparisons over time and/or across space. 
In the individualistic and welfarist tradition to which this paper 
belongs, one starts modelling individual agents and then proceeds to 
examine aggregation procedures. Ideally, for welfare purposes we need 
two items at the individual level: a set of unconditional household 
preferences, defined on commodities and household characteristics, and a 
way to go from household welfare to the welfare of the persons making up 
each household. For the aggregation part, we need a social evaluation 
function (SEF from here on) embodying all the relevant value judgements 
from an ethical point of view. The fundamental question is which should 
be the class of admissible SEFs for empirical analysis. 
To clarify the issues involved, we first consider the simplest 
possible case: a homogeneous population of identical individuals who are 
only allowed to differ in a single dimension called income. Although, in 
principle, the SEF should be defined in utility space, making use of the 
indirect utility function we can examine the relationship between utility 
levels, incomes, and prices. The "named goods" approach, where we care 
about the allocation of commodities to households, is integrated in this 
framework. Our discussion of the SEF's domain concludes with a 
remainder of the fundamental difficulties for justifying welfare analysis in 
income space on the belief that, under general conditions, its conclusions 
will carry over onto utility space. 
In income distribution theory, certain conditions are generally 
assumed without much questioning: symmetry, a preference for equality, 
and continuity. However, all known empirical procedures impose other 
restrictions on an admissible SEF which are based -more or less 
informally- on two closely related ideas. On the one hand, in the ethical 
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approach to the measurement of inequality one would like to use a SEF to 
which one can associate, in a consistent way, only one inequality index. On 
the other hand, it is very convenient to work with a SEF which can be 
expressed in terms of only two statistics of the income distribution: the 
mean, and a measure of inequality. 
As Dutta and Esteban (1991) have shown, to achieve these 
objectives we need to specify the type of mean-invariance property we 
want our inequality indices to satisfy. This is politically important, since 
we know from the early discussion in Kolm (1976a) that the choice of a 
mean-invariance class of inequality measures is not merely a technical 
matter, but a value ladden question. Moreover, recent reports based on 
questionnaires indicate that people are by no means unanimous in their 
choice between relative, absolute or other intermediate notions of 
inequality(l). 
Here, we will consider only the two polar cases of scale-invariant 
and translation-invariant inequality measures, or indices of relative and 
absolute inequality, respectiveley. This amounts to the requirement that 
the SEF satisfies what Dutta and Esteban call weak homotheticity in the 
relative case, and weak translability in the absolute case. To ensure that 
social welfare responds positively to increases in the mean, the SEF must 
satisfy also an appropiate monotonicity condition in either case. To permit 
comparisons of populations of different size, a condition on social welfare 
invariance under population replications is usually assumed. This 
completes a minimal axiom set characterising what we call the standard 
model for welfare analysis. 
The standard model captures a preference for efficiency and a 
preference for equality, but is silent on the trade offs between these two 
desirable aims. If one wants a complete welfare ordering of income 
distributions, further restrictions on the class of SEFs are needed. Here we 
will restrict most of our attention to the multiplicative and the additive 
trade oHs between efficiency and equity which result from the admission, 
respectively, of homothetic and translatable SEFs. Of course, completeness 
ans specific trade-oHs are bought at a cost: going beyond the standard 
model, means accepting greater degrees of household welfare 
comparability in our measurement procedures. 
Finally, we must confront the fact that populations are 
heterogeneous. Most societies can be partitioned along many dimensions 
which are important to distinguish for political, social or economic 
reasons. The novelty, perhaps, is that for an increasing number of 
countries we have very rich microeconomic information on both 
household income or expenditures, as well as geographic, demographic, 
educational and other socioeconomic characteristics. Because some of 
these dimensions -typically the demographic ones- entail different needs, 
economists and others have been worrying extensively about them from a 
normative point of view. 
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Three issues related to the heterogeneity of the population will be 
discussed. In the first place, extensions to the inhomogeneous case of 
stochastic dominance criteria, which provide only a partial ordering of all 
income distributions, are contrasted with the typical use of a single set of 
unconditional preferences to adjust households' income for price changes 
and non-income needs. 
In the second place, we admit that the assumption of a common 
unconditional utility function, necessary for the pooling of all units into a 
single distribution of comparable or equivalent incomes, only permits 
inter-household, not inter-personal, welfare comparisons. In the abscence 
of information on how total income is shared by persons inside the 
household, we can still discuss extensions of the domain of the social 
evaluation problem by means of different schemes for weighting the 
adjusted income distribution by different measures of household size. We 
suggest how should Daltonian transfers be defined in adjusted income 
space under alternative weighting schemes to avoid certain paradoxes 
raised by Glewwe (l99l). 
In the third place, if we accept the convenience of having SEFs 
decomposable by population subgroup, then we believe that aggregate 
welfare should be something more than the weighted sum of welfare 
within each of the subgroups. In particular, it seems intuitively acceptable 
that if the inequality between the subgroups -however defined- increases, 
aggregate welfare should decrease. It is seen that, together with the rest of 
the axioms reviewed, welfare decomposition into a within-group term 
and a between-group inequality component, leads, in the relative case, to a 
SEF which is the product of the distribution mean and Theil's first index 
of equality and, in the absolute case, to the Kolm-Pollak family of SEFs. 
It should be said at the outset that there is little new in this paper. 
It is rather a review essay with an operational aim in mind, which extends 
and updates the treatment found, for example, in Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1980). Nevertheless, we believe that the suggested framework serves to 
clarify a number of traditional issues on i) the proper domain of the social 
evaluation problem; H) the need to consider alternative mean invariant 
inequality notions; Hi) the decomposition of changes in real welfare into 
changes of the mean at constant prices and changes in real inequality; iv) 
the nature of the inter-household welfare comparability assumptions 
implicit in all empirical work, and v) the strong implications of 
separability assumptions necessary for inequality and welfare 
decomposition by population subgroups. Perhaps, the main novelty is the 
realization of the great simplification achieved if income adjustment 
procedures for taking into account of non-income needs are independent 
of household utility levels -an assumption originally introduced in the 
theoretical literature by Lewbel (1989) and Blackorby and Donaldson (1989) 
in the relative case, which is extended here to the absolute case. If the 
paper conveys a sense of the benefits of the axiomatic method for welfare 
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measurement, and contributes to justify or improve current empirical 
procedures, it will have satisfied its purpose. 
The rest of the paper consists of three sections. In section one, we 
present the standard model for a homogeneous population, other 
assumptions on the trade off between equity and efficiency, and the 
distributional role of price changes. Section two, which is devoted to the 
inhomogeneous case, contains a comparison of stochastic dominance 
criteria for bivariate distributions versus complete approaches leading to 
strong cardinal conclusions, a review of alternative ways of weighting 
households for social evaluation, a presentation of additively 
decomposable welfare measures, and a discussion of the simplifying 
implications of making income adjustment procedures independent of 
household utility levels. The third section concludes with a summary of 
assumptions and functional forms. 
4
 
I. THE HOMOGENEOUS CASE 
1.1. The domain of the social evaluation function in the simplest 
possible case 
Assume we have a population of H identical households facing a 
price vector p in R~. They are characterised by their income xh , and a . 
utility function Uh defined on the commodity space R~. Since all 
households are identical in every non-income dimension, there is little 
harm in assuming that there exists a common utility function for all of 
them, ruling out the case of identical individuals being different pleasure 
machines. Thus, we assume: 
hu =U (q) =U(q) for all h =1, ... , H, 
where q is a commodity vector in R:. 
Under general conditions on the direct utility function, there will 
exist an indirect utility function and a cost function denoted, respectively, 
~ 
u = <p(x, p) 
and 
x = c(u, p). 
Thus, in a given sample of utility maximising and price taking consuming 
units, the observable data on prices, incomes, and commodity demands 
for each h are related by 
uh =U(qh) =<p(xh, p) 
and 
h hx =c(u ,p). 
A Social Evaluation Function (SEF) is a real valued function S 
defined in the space RH of utility vectors, with the interpretation that for 
each utility vector u = (u1,...,uH ), S(u) provides the "social" or, simply, the 
aggregate welfare from a normative point of view(2). Using the indirect 
utility function common to all units, the connection between utilities, 
incomes, and prices will be: 
where the function W depends on p. 
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In the "named good" approach, where "who gets which goods" 
matters, the domain of the social evaluation problem becomes the space of 
allocations q =(ql,...,qH) in R:'H, Under general conditions, 5en (1976) 
establishes the existence of personalised prices 1t = (1t1" .. ,1tH) in R:'H, 
which serve to precipitate a partial social ordering 9t on that space: given 
two allocations q and r in R~'H, 
1t q > 1t r => q 9t r, 
Introducing a monotonicity condition, Herrero and Villar (1989) extend 9t 
into a complete ordering. In a competitive context, if the social marginal 
rate of substitution between any pair of goods for an individual coincides 
with her private rate of substitution between these goods at market prices 
p, the ordering 9\ can be represented by an additive 5EF defined in income 
space. For each h, let xh and yh be the incomes associated, respectively, to 
the allocations q and I, that is, let 
xh =P qh, yh = P rh, h =1,...,H. 
Then 
q 9\ I ~ 1:h wh xh ~ 1:h wh yh, 
where the weights wh may depend on q, p and H. Therefore, using the 
direct utility function, we can establish a relation between the 5EF 5 
defined in the space of household utilities and that class of additive 5EFs 
defined in income space: 
In both approaches, a natural question to ask is: under what 
conditions it does not matter whether we carry the analysis in income 
space or, directly, in utility space? In other words, under what conditions 
on U can we take the functions 5 and W to be the same or, at least, under 
what conditions can we be sure that the recommendations by Ware 
congruent with the recommendations by 5? 
In most welfare economics, social or aggregate welfare is supposed 
to be related to efficiency and distributional aspects of the problem at hand. 
In the area of income inequality, distributional considerations are 
summarized by an inequality index I, which is a real valued function 
defined on the space of income distributions, normalized to take values in 
the interval [0,1]. In the ethical approach to inequality measurement, one 
tries to derive inequality indices from specific social evaluation functions 
in a consistent way. Formally, we say that an inequality measure I is 
6 
normatively significant for -or consistent with- a SEF, say W, if for any 
two distributions x and y with the same mean, 
I(x) ~ I(y) ~ W(x) s W(y). 
As Zubiri (1985) demonstrates, due to the non-linearities of the 
indirect utility function, income inequality will be a good predictor of 
utility inequality only under very stringent conditions on both 
fundamental preferences and admissible inequality measures. In general, 
we can have an inequality index I] normatively significant for 5 and 
another 12 normatively significant for W -not necessarily distinct and two 
pairs of distributions (u, x) and (v, y), with uh = <p(xh,p) and vh = <p(yh,p) 
for each h, such that 
Therefore, the social evaluation of income distributions at common prices 
need not lead to the same ranking as the social evaluation of the 
corresponding utility vectors. This means, in turn, that welfare analysis in 
income space has to be justified by its own merits. 
1.2. The standard model 
In the ethical approach to inequality measurement we hope that 
the conditions imposed on the SEF will serve two purposes: that attractive 
features of the SEF are inherited by the inequality measure, and that these 
conditions permit to single out a unique inequality index. Among the 
features that a SEF is always assumed to satisfy in the present paradigm, 
are symmetry or anonimity and Dalton's principle of progressive transfers, 
which are best captured by the property of S-concavity (assumption A.1 for 
later reference). Also, we will assume throughout that the SEF is 
continous (A.2). 
In this context, what we call the standard model is characterised by 
the convenient simplification of making social welfare a function of only 
two statistics: the mean of the distribution, and an inequality index. Thus, 
if we denote by j.l the function giving the mean, it is worth while to know 
under what conditions on a SEF there exists an inequality index I and a 
unique real valued function V defined on R2 such that 
W(x) = V[j.l(x), I(x)] , 
with V increasing in its first argument and decreasing in its second 
argument(3). 
There are many ways to derive reference-free, consistent inequality 
measures from a given SEF(4). For later reference, consider the following 
two well known procedures. Given an income distribution x, define the 
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equally-distributed-equivalent-income (EDEI) ~ as the minimum income 
that, when assigned to every household, leads to the same social welfare as 
the original distribution; that is, define ~(x) implicitly by 
W(~(x),...,~(x» = W(x). 
If we let T(x) be the total income associated with a distribution x, the 
expression 
T(x) - H~(x) 
will be positive except when x is an egalitarian distribution giving the 
mean to all individuals. Since it provides the amount of total income 
wasted due to inequality in the distribution x, dividing by T(x) we obtain 
the proportion of total income wasted due to inequality: 
IAK5(x) =[T(x) - H~(x)]/T(x) =1 - ~(x)/J.1(x). 
Similarly, dividing by H we obtain the per capita income wasted due to 
inequality: 
IKBD(X) = [T(x) - H~(x)]/H = J.1(x) - ~(x)(5). 
These two measures of inequality are normatively significant for W, 
continous, and S-convex(6). 
The problem, as Dutta and Esteban (1992) have shown, is that it is 
possible to find at least two ordinally different inequality measures which 
are both normatively significant for a given SEF. This might not be 
surprising in view of the plethora of indices which could be consistently 
derived from a given SEF. The practical lesson is that we must go beyond 
consistency, and be more specific about how to separate changes in total 
income from distributional changes. 
Consider, for instance, the two classes of inequality indices that 
have received the most attention in the literature. Relative indices are 
homogeneous of degree zero in incomes, so that an equal proportional 
change in incomes leaves the level of inequality unchanged. Absolute 
inequality indices, on the other hand, are invariant to equal absolute 
changes in individual incomes. Dutta and Esteban (1992) define two 
inequality indices to be mean invariant equivalent if they require 
additional incomes to be distributed in the same way to maintain the same 
level of inequality. Thus, for example, all indices of relative inequality are 
mean invariant equivalent, and so are all indices of absolute inequality. 
Dutta and Esteban go on to establish that any SEF implies a unique 
normatively significant inequality measure within any prespecified mean­
invariance equivalence class(7). 
The selection of a mean invariance class of inequality measures 
imposes a corresponding restriction on the form of the SEF which 
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generates it. Dutta and Esteban (1992) find the nature of this restriction in 
the general case. As a corollary, they obtain Ebert (1987) characterisation of 
the class of weakly homothetic SEFs generating relative inequality indices, 
as well as a characterisation of the class of weakly translatable SEFs 
generating absolute inequality indices(S>. These classes are considerably 
wider than, respectively, the class of homothetic SEFs and the class of 
translatable SEFs. 
The search for the conditions under which the standard model 
works is now complete. Let a SEF W satisfy A.l and A.2, and select a class 
of mean invariant inequality indices, say, the class of relative measures. 
Then W can be expressed as a function of the mean and an inequality 
index of the given class consistent with W if, and only if, W is weakly 
homothetic (A.3R). Similarly, this is possible for the class of absolute 
indices if, and only if, W is weakly translatable (A.3A). To ensure that 
social welfare will be increasing in the mean, an appropriate monotonicity 
assumption is needed in each case: W must be either increasing along rays 
from the origin in the relative case (A.4R), or increasing along rays parallel 
to the line of equality in the absolute case (A.4A). 
To permit comparisons of populations of different size, we will 
make an assumption, usually refered to as Dalton's Population Principle 
or replication invariance (A.S), which says that social welfare is invariant 
under replications of the population. Since most inequality measures used 
in practice satisfy this condition, and in the standard model aggregate 
welfare is a function of only the mean and the inequality of each 
distribution, it is reasonable to accept A.S. 
1.3. The trade off between efficiency and equity 
Empirical methods have been developed by Shorrocks (1983), 
Kakwani (1984), Moyes (1987), and Chakravarty (1988) for the unanimous 
ranking of distributions by all members in wide classes of SEF satisfying 
the conditions just discussed(9). A feature of this approach, is that none of 
these procedures can rank all conceivable distributions. Naturally, 
whether this lack of completeness poses or not a serious problem has to be 
judged in each empirical application. On the other hand, the limited inter­
household welfare comparability that these procedures assume, only 
allows us to conclude that, when the dominance conditions are satisfied, 
one distribution is prefered by another, but not by how much. 
In this paper, we pursue the selection of complete indicators which 
allow the quantitative decomposition of welfare changes into changes in 
the mean, and changes in either relative or absolute inequality. For that 
purpose, we have to be more specific about the trade off between efficiency 
and equality. One way to proceed, is simply to select a particular SEF 
satisfying A.l to A.5, as in Ebert (1987), which presents an example of a 
weakly homothetic SEF involving the Gini index of inequality, or as in 
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Shorrocks (1989) who indicates that any index I of relative inequality with 
the usual properties is normatively significant for the SEF 
W(x) =J.L(x) exp [- I(x)] . 
We may consider also the parametrization suggested by Graaf (1977) and 
discussed by Atkinson (1989): 
W(x) =J.L(x) [I(x)] a, ae [0,1]. 
Finally, we will review the following well known polar cases 
which lead to easily interpretable trade offs(1O). Homotheticity (A.6R) of 
the SEF is necessary and sufficient for the scale-invariance of the inequality 
index derived according to the AKS procedure which make use of the 
concept of the EDEI. Similarly, translability (A.6A) of the SEF is necessary 
and sufficient for the translation-invariance of the inequality index 
derived according to the KBD procedure. Also, any homothetic SEF can be 
expressed as the product of the mean and the AKS equality index: 
while any translatable SEF can be expressed as the difference between the 
mean and the KBD inequality index: 
W(x) =J.L(x) - IKBD(x). 
Of course, these assumptions require strong interhousehold 
welfare comparability conditions in income space. If the underlying social 
evaluation ordering is continous, is restricted to the non negative orthant 
of RH, and satisfies ratio-scale comparability, then it can be represented by, 
and only by, a homothetic social evaluation function W. Similarly, if the 
underlying social evaluation ordering is continous, and satisfies difference 
comparability, then it can be represented by, and only by, a translatable 
social evaluation function W(l1>. 
I. 4. The distributional role of price changes 
In practice, we are bound to face two or more populations facing 
hdifferent prices. Let x be the income of household h in situation t, with h 
t 
=1 ,...,H , and t =1, 2. Now we have 
t t 
S(u ) =S[<p(x1t,Pl),.. ·,<P(xHt, Pl)] =F(x1, Pl) =W(x ),1 1
where W depends on P1' and 
S(u ) =S[<p(x1t,P2),···,<p(xHt, P2)] =F(x2, P2) =W(x2)2
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where W depends on P2' In general(12), neither of these SEFs can be used 
to compare the original money distributions xl and x2. However, we can 
express them at common prices using a true cost-of-living index, say of the 
Paasche type, defined as follows: 
P(P-r Po; u) =c(u, Pt)/c(u, po)' 
The function P compares the price vector in situation t, p , with the vector
t 
of base prices Po at the household utility level u. Individual income in real 
terms is simply: 
h h h h 
x = x /P(p, Po; u ) = c(u ,po)' to t t t t 
Then, for t =1,2, 
so that x20 and x are comparable in terms of the function W which nowlO 
depends on Po in both situations. 
. h hAs we have seen, the income adjustment from x to x causes no 
t to 
welfare change at the individual level. However, at the aggregate level the 
change from Pt to Po produces two effects. To see this, suppose that all 
households experience as inflationary the change from Pl to Po -so that 
P(Pl' Po; ~h) > 1 for every h- but assume that relative prices have evolved 
less unfavorably for the poor. Then, to maintain their utility levels, the 
rich must get an income compensation relatively larger than the poor. 
Thus, on the one hand, we will observe that inequality is larger at x thanlO 
at xl' This is a distributional change worth studying from an ethical point 
of view. On the other hand, since x~O is greater than x~ for all h, we will 
observe that Il(x 0) will be greater than Il(x ), a purely monetary1 t 
phenomenon without normative significance, which suggests that we 
should avoid comparisons of income means evaluated at different price 
vectors. As far as the change in means is concerned, what matters for social 
evaluations is the comparison between ll(x ) and ll(x )'20 lO
Given a SEF W satisfying A.1 to A.6R, let x~O be such that 
1 1
 
where I is the index of relative inequality consistent with W. Then, the 
welfare change in real terms between situations 1 and 2 can be expressed as 
~W = W(X )· W(x ) == [W(x~O) - W(x )] + [W(x ) - W(x~o>]20 10 10 20
=[~(x20) - ~(xlO)] E(x ) + [E (x ) • E(x )] ~(x20)·10 20 lO
The first term is the change in welfare due to the change in the means in 
real terms, measured along the ray of situation l's relative equality at 
prices po. The second term is the change in welfare attributed to the change 
in real equality, weighted by situation 2's mean at base prices. The latter, in 
turn, can be seen to be equal to 
This is the sum of three terms: the change in equality induced by the 
change in relative prices from Pl to Po' a similar term due to the change in 
relative prices from P2 to Po' and the change in money inequality. 
If the SEF W satisfies A.l to A.6A and we denote by A the index of 
absolute inequality consistent with W, we have 
In this case the change in real welfare is simply equal to the change in 
means in real terms minus the change in real absolute inequality. Since 
absolute inequality is not independent of the unit of measurement, it is 
not useful to decompose the change in real inequality into terms which 
will contain the effect of the change in relative prices and the change in 
the general price level. 
Naturally, the welfare change in real terms and its decomposition 
into a change in the mean and a change in relative or absolute inequality, 
will vary if we reprice the original money distributions at different base 
prices. A circumstance seldom taken into account in empirical studies(l3). 
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II. THE INHOMOGENEOUS CASE 
11.1. The domain of the SEF 
Let us admit that households are heterogeneous, and let A be the 
set of household characteristics which give rise to ethically relevant 
differences in needs. Thus, households may now differ in income xh 
and/or a vector of characteristics ah in A. There can be a number M of 
different household types with 1 < M S H. Within each type rn, all 
households have identical characteristics: 
If M =H, then all households are different. 
Since Pollak and Wales (1979), it is generally agreed that, for 
welfare purposes, households must be endowed with unconditional 
preferences defined on commodities and characteristics, that is, on pairs (q, 
a) in R: x A. If we are realistic and allow households to have different 
preferences, we would have to find a theoretical justification -and an 
operational way- to make, at a minimum, interhousehold ordinal level 
comparisons of the sort 
with (qh, ah) not necessarily distinct from (qk, ak). In other words, we 
would need what Pollak (1991) calls a "welfare correspondence" to 
determine which indifference curve on one household's map yields the 
same welfare level as a particular curve on each other's map. 
Lacking a theory to do that, one way to proceed is by assuming that 
there exists a common unconditional utility function for all households: 
u =Uh(q, a) =U(q, a) for all h =1, ..., H. 
In terms of these fundamental preferences we can make what Pollak 
(1991) calls "situational comparisons" of household utilities. The indirect 
utility function and the cost function will be denoted, respectively, by 
u = <p(x, p, a) 
and 
x = c(u, p, a). 
To ensure level comparability of unconditional utilities, only the 
following transformations are allowed: 
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U"(q, a) =~[U(q, a)] , 
where ~ is a monotonic increasing function. 
In a given sample of utility maximising and price taking 
households, the observable data on prices, incomes, characteristics, and 
commodity demands for each h are related by 
uh =U(qh, ah) = <p(xh, p, ah) 
and 
xh = c(uh, p, ah)04>. 
The conection between utilities, incomes, prices and characteristics is now 
given by 
In income distribution theory we cannot treat symmetrically the 
vector of household incomes x = (xl, ...,xH ), each component of which is 
supposed to serve different needs. There are two approaches to this 
question. The first one, extends previous results in income distribution 
dominance to the inhomogeneous case. Atkinson and Bourguignon 
(1987) start from a SEF in which aggregate welfare is a weighted sum of 
welfare within each of the subgroups in the partition by ethically relevant 
characteristics. Subgroup welfare is the sum of the social valuation of 
income for each household in the subgroup, which is taken to be a 
function of income and a continous, one dimensional index n of 
household need. In our notation, 
Then, conditions are provided for first- and second-degree 
dominance, which are obtained by making relatively weak assumptions 
about the relationship between income and needs, i.e., an assumption on 
the sign of the cross-derivative of income and the index of needs, which 
implies an ethical ranking of the m household types; and an assumption 
on higher deriva,tives which implies that we become less concerned about 
differences in needs at higher incomes, or that the degree of diminishing 
marginal valuation of income becomes smaller as we move to less needy 
subgroupsOS). 
Like in the homogeneous case, the drawbacks of this approach are 
that the sequential dominance criteria do not provide a complete 
ordering, and that they do not allow conclusions about how much welfare 
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has improved. In addition, this framework is not suited for the question 
posed in the following example. 
Suppose that total income is equally distributed within two 
populations, so that each individual receives the mean income of the 
group, but that the two means are different. For instance, two individuals 
of type A and three of type B receive, respectively, (10, 10) and (6, 6, 6) units 
of income. Under perfect equality, aggregate welfare in each group can be 
identified with the mean, 10 and 6, respectively. H, for example, type A has 
less needs, its mean should be corrected and may be reduced to 8. Suppose 
now that the two groups decide to live together in a single community. 
Should aggregate welfare in the new community be simply a weighted 
average of subgroup welfare? It can be argued that there is now a new 
source of inequality which should cause a reduction in aggregate welfare 
below that average, but the income dominance approach is silent on this 
feature of the situation06>. 
The second approach in the literature seeks complete orderings 
and strong cardinal assertions on inequality and welfare change. The 
starting point is the adjustment of household incomes using a set of 
equivalence scales defined in terms of the cost function as follows: 
If we take the reference household aD to consist of a single adult, the 
function d gives the number of equivalent adults in a household of 
characteristics ah who can enjoy the utility level u at prices p. For each h 
in the sample, define the adjusted, or equivalent, household income by 
This is the income necessary for a single adult to enjoy the utility level uh 
at prices p. Alternatively, we can define the compensation function 
d"(ah, aD; p, u) =c(u, p, ah) - c(u, p, aD) 
which gives the income we can subtract from a household of 
characteristics ah for a single adult to enjoy the same utility level u at 
prices p with the remaining income. Then 
In the important case of comparisons between two heterogeneous 
populations confronting different price vectors in situations t =I, 2, 
equivalent household income would be: 
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h h hh h hO 
z °=xt / [P(p, Po; u , a ) d(a , a ; Po' u )]t t t t t 
_ h . h h _ It h 0. h _ h ° 
- [x /P(p, Po' u ,a )] d (a , a , Po' u ) - c(u , Po' a ).
t t t t t t 
Of course, for each h we have 
h h h h 
u =q>(x , p..., a ) =q>(z , Po' af1,
t t· t to 
while for every pair of households h, k, we have 
h k h ° k ° h k
z ~ z ~ c(u , Po' a ) ~ c(u , Po' a ) ~ u ~ u ;W W t t t t 
that is, the income adjusted for price change and non-income needs 
provides a comparable indicator of household welfare. 
This fact provides good conceptual and political reasons for 
worrying about aggregation in adjusted income space. The social 
evaluation problem can be finally stated as 
with 
S(u ) = F(x ,p..., a ) = F(z 0' Po' aO) = W(z 0)' t = 1,2,
t t· t t t 
where the function W depends on both Po and aO. Since adjusted incomes 
are now comparable, W can now be taken to be symmetric, as implied in 
the standard model when we assume W to be S-concave. 
11.2. The weighting of households for social evaluation 
It should be clear that the assumption of a common utility 
function, defined on household consumption and characteristics, only 
allows us to compare the household welfare of households of different 
characteristics. That is, it only allows us to perform inter-household, not 
inter-personal, welfare comparisons. 
This presents a problem, since in welfare economics we are mostly 
interested in personal welfare. Budget surveys contain little information 
on how household income or expenditure is shared by persons inside 
each household. Also, recent developments of testable theories on this 
allocation problem, although very promising, have not yet reached 
suitable results for regular use in income distribution analysis(17). Surely, 
without better data it is hard to see how to make in practice inter-personal 
comparisons of utility both within and across households. 
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However, without abandoning the present framework, we can still 
ask whether we want to count all households equally. There is no 
difficulty in extending the domain of the SEF, weighting each household 
h by the scalar ~h: 
S(u1,oo., u1,oo., uH,oo., uH) =W(zl,oo., z1,oo. ,zH,oo., zH). 
__~L- ~H--- __~l-- ~H--
Lacking ethical reasons to discriminate within types, we will restrict 
ourselves to the case in which all households of the same type rn, receive 
the same weight ~rn. 
It is important to realize how Daltonian transfers should be 
implemented in this context. We suggest to define progressive (regressive) 
transfers of equivalent income from a household h to a poorer (richer) 
household k, so as to leave unchanged both the ranking between hand k, 
as well as total equivalent income. However, as we will see, transfers 
which preserve the mean of equivalent incomes will usually require 
changes in the mean of unadjusted incomes. 
Let z and z. be the distributions before and after a progressive 
transfer of 6z units of equivalent income from household h to household 
k, where zk < zh. Then 
and 
Hi) z. j =zi for all j * h,k. 
Therefore ~(z.) = ~(z). At common prices, if the adjustment is achieved by 
means of equivalence scales, so that 
and 
z.k =x.k/d(ak, aO; u. k) =[xk/d(ak, aO; uh)] + (6z/~k), 
we have 
6xh =x. h - xh =[[d(ah, aO; u.h)/d(ah, aO; uh)] -l)xh 
_d(ah, aO; u.h)6z/~h, 
and 
6xk =x. k _xk =([d(ak, aO; u.k)/d(ak, aO; uk)] -l)xk 
+ d(ak, aO; u .k)6z/~k. 
In the absolute case, where 
Iand 
zt k = xtk _d"(ak, aD; utk) =[xk _d"(ak, aD; uh)] + (~/~k), 
we have 
~xh =d"(ah,aD; ut h) _d"(ah, aD; uh) _~/~h 
and 
~xk = d"(ak, aD; utk) _d"(ak, aD; uk) + ~/~k. 
It should be clear that, in the abscence of restrictions on 
fundamental preferences, ~xh and ~xk will not generally coincide in 
absolute value. Naturally, this will alter all households' relative and 
absolute positions in the unadjusted income distribution and, therefore, it 
might change drastically relative and absolute inequality after the transfer. 
For example, under A.I a regressive transfer of equivalent income will 
lead to an increase of inequality, but it might give rise to a decrease in 
inequality in unadjusted income space. Nevertheless, this should cause 
no particular concern, since we know that the latter is not the distribution 
ethically relevant in the inhomogeneous caseOS). 
11.3. Welfare decomposition by population subgroup 
For any partition of the population, we are interested in welfare 
measures capable of distinguishing -in a convenient additive way­
between two components: welfare within the subgroups, and the loss of 
welfare due to inequality between the subgroups. To achieve this practical 
aim, we will have to impose further restrictions on SEFs. As we will see, 
these restrictions will be final, because we will end up with a single 
homothetic SEF for the relative case, and a family of translatable SEFs for 
the absolute case. 
Without loss of generality, we will consider unweighted 
distributions of equivalent income. Although the results presented in this 
section are valid for any partition of the population, for illustrative 
purposes we will always refer to the partition according to the ethically 
relevant household characteristics. There are different ways to decompose 
a summary statistic like an inequality or a welfare index. The following 
two are the best known. 
Method I 
Consider the three distributions: 
where for each rn, 
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(1) is the adjusted income distribution; in (2) there is no within group 
inequality because each household has been assigned her subgroup mean 
income Jl(zm), and in (3) there is no inequality because each household 
receives the population mean Jl(z). In method I, between-group inequality 
is defined as the inequality that would arise in a movement from (3) to (2). 
Then, one investigates under what conditions overall inequality can be 
expressed as 
where the weights am are functions only of the set of subgroup means and 
sizes. 
Since an equality index is just E(z) = 1 - I(z), whenever the weights 
in equation (4) add up to one, i.e., I m am =1, we will have the following 
decomposition for overall equality: 
If we now choose a multiplicative trade off between the mean and the 
equality index, that is, a SEF W such that 
W(z) = ll(z)E(z), 
and subgroup weights are subgroup shares in total income, 
then we will have 
This is a useful expression -to which we will refer as A.7I- that indicates 
that aggregate welfare can be expressed as a weighted average of the 
welfare within each subgroup, with weights equal to population shares, 
minus the between-group inequality according to method I, weighted by 
the population mean. 
It is well known(9 ) that an index of relative inequality has 
continous first order derivatives, satisfies S-convexity and the Population 
Principle, and admits the decomposition of equation (4) if, and only if, it is 
a positive scalar multiple of an index from the General Entropy family: 
Ic(z) = [1/Hc(c -l)]~[[zh /Jl(z)]C -1] , CE R, c ~ 0, 1, 
Io(z) = [1/H]Ih[1n Jl(z) - In xh] , c =0, 
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The weights in the decomposition are equal to 
so that .trncxrn = 1only if c =0 or 1. In these cases 
respectively. Therefore, if we choose a SEF W1 such that 
we will have 
Following a suggestion in Herrero and Villar (1989), the function 
W1 can be rationalised within the "named goods" approach reviewed in 
the first section. There we saw that 
where the weights wh may depend on the allocation of commodities to 
households, market prices, and population size. Let us make 
wh =[1 -In (zhIJ.L(z)]/H, 
so that households whose income equals the population mean receive a 
weight equal to I/H, and households with income above or below the 
mean receive weights increasingly smaller or greater, respectively, than 
1/H. Then it can be shown that the function W becomes Wl' 
Method 11 
Blackorby, Donaldson and Auersperg (l981) suggest a different 
conceptual experiment. They study ethical indices of inequality derived 
from a SEF by.the AKS or the KBD procedure, and consider the two 
distributions 
where for each rn, 
In (6) there is no within group inequality, while in (7) there is no 
inequality at all. In method 11, the between-group component of inequality 
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is defined as the inequality that would result if each household received 
her subgroup's EDEI !;m; that is, as the inequality produced in going from 
(7) to (6), measured as the percentage of total income wasted in the AKS 
case, or the per capita loss in the KBD case. Similarly, the within-group 
component will be the percentage of total income wasted, or the per capita 
loss, in the movement from (6) to the original distribution. 
In method n all distributions have the same level of social welfare, 
W(Z) = W(!;*) = W(!;), while in method I W(z), W(J,1*), and W(J,1) are all 
different. Thus, Blackorby et al indicate that their intergroup inequality 
index measures differences in the actual economic positions of the 
subgroups rather than their potential positions at the mean of the 
corresponding distributions. The difference between the two approaches 
can be seen in an example of a population of two males with incomes (l0, 
10), and two females with incomes (l8, 2). Since both subgroup means are 
10, method I would measure between-group inequality as zero. Using 
instead the EDEls to eliminate the inequality within each subgroup, 
method 11 would generate positive intergroup inequality, reflecting the 
fact that in this example the sexes do not receive equal treatment. 
Naturally, one could construct an example in which!;1 = !;2 but Jll :jt Jl2, 
with the implications reversed. 
To apply method 11, for any partition subgroup inequality must be 
independent on outside incomes. If W is continous, increasing, and S­
concave, Blackorby et al established that this minimal condition leads to 
the additive separability of W, i. e. 
where '¥ is increasing in its argument and Cl> is concave. We will refer to 
this condition as assumption A.7II. If, in addition, W is translatable, then 
it can only be the Kolm-Pollak family: 
Wfz) =-[1/y] Inl(1/H) ~ e _yzh], y> 0, 
where y is interpreted as an aversion to inequality parameter: as y 
increases, the social indifference curves show increasing curvature until 
only the income of the poorest person matters. The KBD index of absolute 
inequality consistent with Wy ' or the Kolm-Pollak index, is 
Afz) = (1/y] In I (1 /H)1:h e y (J,1(z) - zh)], y> O. 
Since 
Afz) = 1:mIHm/H]Afzm) + Af!;""), 
we have 
(8) Wfz) = Jl(z) - Afz) = 1:m[Hm/HlWfzm) - Af!;"")· 
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This is an appealing decomposition, in which social welfare is seen to be 
equal to the weighted average of the aggregate welfare within each of the 
subgroups, with weights equal to population shares, minus the inequality 
between the subgroups according to method 11. 
When all incomes are restricted to be positive and W is 
homothetic, continous, increasing, S-concave, and additively separable, 
then W becomes the family of means of order r: 
Wr(Z) =[1/H]~ <zh)r]l/ r, r,* 0, r S 1 
nh<zh)I/H, r = O. 
The AKS index of relative inequality consistent with Wr is the Atkinson 
family 
r =0. 
The problem is that the index Ir does not admit a convenient 
decomposition into a within-group term and a between-group term and, 
therefore, neither does Wr . Under this approach nothing else can be 
achieved in the relative case, so that we recommend using the SEF W1 
obtained via method 1. 
n.4 A useful restriction on household preferences 
As pointed out in Muellbauer (l974a), in the inhomogeneous case 
we must face a second index number problem. The conversion of the 
income distributions x into the adjusted or equivalent distributions z for 
t t 
t = 1, 2, is conditional on a reference vector of characteristics aO. If such 
reference vector varies, so will the values of W(z ) and, therefore, the 
t 
empirical results for welfare change. 
A particular aspect of such a problem deserves closer attention. Let 
us consider a homogeneous subgroup of the population sharing the 
vector of characteristics am. Households in this group have the same 
needs, but identical characteristics might be enjoyed differently depending 
on the income level. For instance, identical households might experience 
different economies of scale in consumption depending on their income 
level. Ignoring common prices, this phenomenon is captured in the 
functions d(am, aO; uh) and d"'(am, aO; uh), which depend on household 
welfare. 
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At the individual level, the switch from am to aD does not alter 
households' utility levels. However, at the aggregate level we have two 
effects. Because the rich take advantage of economies of scale at different 
intensities than the poor, both relative and absolute inequality of the 
distribution xm will differ from the inequality of equivalent income zm. 
Just as the impact of changing relative prices from a given price vector to 
base prices varies with the reference price vector, whether we choose a 
single adult or a couple as reference type will have empirical consequences 
for the measurement of inequality within homogeneous subgroups. 
On the other hand, there is a scale effect which will affect both the 
mean and the EDEI of the adjusted distribution. For example, if for all 
households in subgroup m, d(am, aD; uh) > 1 -or d"(am, aD; uh) ~ 0- we will 
have that Jl(zm) < Jl(xm) and, whether we use an homothetic or translatable 
SEF, ~(zm) < ~(xm). This effect resembles the pure monetary effect induced 
by the adjustment of money incomes to changes in the general price level 
and, consequently, it lacks normative significance or each group in 
isolation. However, since its magnitude will vary across groups, it will 
have an impact on the measurement of overall inequality and welfare. 
Such an impact will depend on the value judgement implicit in the 
choice of reference type. 
By the combined influence of these two forces, the welfare of every 
homogeneous subgroup depends on the choice of the reference type. 
Thus, for example, if the adjustment process is pro-rich, Le. if d(am, aD; uh) 
or d*(am, aD; uh) are smaller for the rich, then I(zm) > I(xm) or A(zm) > 
A(xm) in the relative or the absolute case. Hence, W(zm) < W(xm). 
Otherwise, if d(am, aD; uh) or d"(am, aD; uh) are greater for the rich, then 
the improvement in inequality of equivalent income may compensate the 
reduction of the mean. In either case, the within-group welfare term in 
adjusted income space will bear a complex relationship with the same 
term for unadjusted incomes, and the difference between these two 
concepts will vary depending on the reference type. 
Because of the scale effect, in both the relative and the absolute 
case the between-group component of inequality will change with the 
reference type and will be different from that term for the unadjusted 
distribution. Thus, both terms in the decomposition of overall welfare 
given in equations (5) and (8), will vary with the reference type and the 
form of the fundamental cost function which determines the way in 
which d and d" vary as a function of utility levels. 
It seems worth while to consider the special case in which the 
extent of the economies of scale in consumption are the same 
independently of the level of unadjusted income or, more generally, the 
case in which the functions d and d" are independent of utility levels. Of 
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course, this will restrict household preferences. The function d is 
independent of utility levels -condition IB (Independent of Base utility) in 
Lewbel (1989), or EES (Equivalence-Scale Exactness) in Blackorby and 
Donaldson (1989)- if, and only if, the cost function adopts the following 
form, which we will refer to as assumption A.8R: 
du, p, a) =feu, p)g(p, a). 
As Blackorby and Donaldson (1989) show, this restriction on preferences is 
equivalent to a condition on interhousehold comparisons which requires 
that, if there exist incomes such that the members of two households 
facing the same prices are equally well-off, then any scaling of household 
incomes preserves equality of well-being. It is a normalization on income­
consumption curves which, however, does not require them to be straight 
lines. 
Similarly, it can be shown that in the absolute case the function d'" 
is independent of the utility level if, and only if, the cost function becomes 
du, p, a) =feu, p) + g(p, a). 
This assumption A.SA implies also a corresponding restriction on 
interhousehold comparisons or a normalization on income-consumption 
curves. 
Under A.8R and A.8A, equivalent incomes in a given subgroup m 
will differ from unadjusted incomes in a constant -either d(am , aD) or 
d*(am , aO)_ depending only on the reference type. Therefore, at constant 
prices, relative and absolute inequality before and after the adjustment 
will be the same independently of the reference type aO; 
if I is an index of relative inequality, and 
if A is an index of absolute inequality. 
As far as the effect on the subgroup means, in the relative case we 
have 
~m =~(zm) = 11;/d(am, a~, 
where ~m =Il(xm). Therefore, if W is homothetic, then for each m 
x 
Since, in addition, 
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it can be shown that equation (5) for the Theil welfare measure becomes 
where 
1 M 1 1~ M M~11(11 ,.··,11 )=11[Il/d(a ,a-J,.··,ll /d(a ,a-J].x 
The within-group term is the weighted average of subgroup welfare 'of 
unadjusted incomes, scaled by the factor d(am, aD). Of course, the impact of 
the choice of aD will be reflected also in the second term of the 
decomposition. 
In the absolute case, 
Ilm= Il(zm) = Ilm- d"'(am, aD).
x 
If W is translatable, then for each m 
Thus, equation (8) for the Kolm-Pollak family becomes 
Wfz) = Lm IHm/HlWfxm) - ImIHm/Hl d"'(am, aD) - Af~l ,. ..,~M), 
where 
Af~1 ,...,~M) = Af~~ - d"'(a1, aD),...,~~ - d"'(aM, aD)]. 
Within-group welfare is independent of the reference type, whose choice 
only affects overall welfare through a demographic term and between­
group inequality. 
In the abscence of restrictions on fundamental preferences, we saw 
that transfers which preserve the mean of equivalent incomes will 
usually require changes in the mean of unadjusted incomes. Under A.8R 
we have that this will not be the case if, and only if, 
On the other hand, under A.8A, transfers which preserve the mean of 
equivalent incomes will not require changes in the mean of unadjusted 
incomes if, and only if, ~h = ~k. Hence, both in the relative and the 
absolute case, transfers of equivalent income between households of the 
same subgroup preserve the mean of the unadjusted incomes. 
However, when the transfer involves households from different 
subgroups the situation is as follows. In the relative case, if the weights are 
25 
the number of equivalent adults, Le., ~h = d(ah , aD) for all h, then the 
mean of the unadjusted incomes is preserved. This is the main reason 
why Ebert (1992) recommends this weighting scheme. In the absolute case, 
total unadjusted income will be constant after the transfer only in· the 
unweighted case. But this does not seem to be a sufficient reason to single 
out these two particular procedures. As a matter of fact, in empirical 
applications in both in the relative and the absolute case, we recommend 
experimenting with different weighting schemes, regardless of the impact 
of equivalent income transfers on the unadjusted distribution. 
For that purpose, we give here the expressions for welfare 
measurement under ASR and A.SA for the weight choices most often 
used in practice. Let y = (yl,... ,yM) be the distribution where adjusted 
incomes are weighted by the number of household members sh(20), and 
assume that all households of type m have the same number sm. Then, 
given A.S, in the relative case we have 
I(yn) = 1[(x1m/d(am, a~, ...,xHm/d(am, aD)] = I(xm), 
______sm______ _ sm __ 
and 
where Sm= mHmis the number of persons of type m, and S = ImSm. Hence, 
Similarly, in the absolute case we have 
Afym) = Ay[(x1m - d"'(am, aD), ...,xHm - d"'(am, aD)] =Afxm), 
________sm________ _ sm _ 
and 
Hence, 
Finally, for the distribution e = (el,...,eM) where adjusted incomes 
are weighted by the number of equivalent adults, in the relative case we 
have 
I(em) = I[(xlm/d(am, ao." ..., xHm/d(am, ao.,] =I(xm), 
---d(am, aD)___ ---d(am, aD)__ 
and 
26 
where E = d(am, aO)H is the number of equivalent adults of type m, and E m m 
= ~mEm' Hence, 
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CONCLUSIONS
 
We have presented a complete framework of analysis to make 
"situational comparisons" in the sense of Pollak (1991) of independent 
cross-sections of household income and non-income household 
characteristics. Making use of the indirect utility function, we have been 
able to examine the relationship between utility levels and observable 
variables like income, prices and characteristics. Under general conditions, 
due to the non-linearities of the indirect utility function, we cannot 
guarantee that welfare recommendations in income space will lead to 
normatively consistent recommendations in utility space, even in the 
simplest case of a homogeneous population. Hence, income distribution 
theory needs a different justification. 
To make any progress at all in the inhomogeneous case, we can 
follow two routes. Firstly, we can assume an additive structure where 
social welfare is a weighted average of subgroup welfare, which, in turn, is 
the sum of the social valuation of income and an index of needs for each 
household in the subgroup. Then, stochastic dominance criteria, coupled 
with relatively weak assumptions on the relationship between income 
and needs, permit an incomplete ordering of income distributions for a 
heterogeneous population. 
Secondly, based on the fundamental utility function, adjusted 
income for price change and ethically relevant non-income needs, 
provides a comparable household welfare indicator. With an operational 
aim in mind, we proceed to ask which properties should be required from 
a SEF defined on adjusted or equivalent income space. 
Consider the standard model where, given a SEF W, there exists a 
unique function V such that 
W(z) = V(Il(z), I(z», 
where 11 is the mean, I is an inequality measure normatively significant for 
W, and V is increasing in its first argument and decreasing in its second 
argument. The following is a minimal set of axioms for W characterising 
this model in the two polar cases for relative and absolute inequality 
measures: 
A. 1. S-concavity 
A. 2. Continuity 
A. 3R. Weak-homotheticity and A. 4R. Monotonicity 
along rays from the origin, if I is an index of relative inequality 
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A. 3A. Weak-translability and A. 4A. Monotonicity 
along rays paralell to the line of equality, if I is an index of absolute 
inequality 
A. 5. Invariance to population replication 
Suppose we are interested in a complete ordering and a cardinal 
interpretation of changes in aggregate welfare, including a quantitative 
decomposition within the standard model of changes in real welfare in 
terms of a change in real means and a change in real inequality. Then, in 
the two polar cases, we may impose on W: 
A. 6R. Homotheticity 
A. 6A. Translability 
Suppose that, in addition, we are interested in welfare decomposition by 
population subgroups in terms of a within-group and a between-group 
component in the partition according to ethically relevant characteristics. 
In the relative case, consider 
where ~ ... is the distribution in which each househlod receives her 
subgroup mean. Assumptions A. 1, A. 2, A. 4R, A. 5, A. 6R and A. 71 are 
satisfied if, and only if, W is 
where 11 is Theil's first inequality index. Consider a minimal condition for 
computing any subgroup EDEI independently of the rest of the population 
where \f' is increasing and <p concave. In the absolute case, A. 1, A. 2, A. 4A, 
A. 5, A. 6A and A. 711 are satisfied if, and only if, W is the Kolm-Pollak 
family Wfz) with y> 0 and 
where ; It is the distribution in which each household receives her 
subgroup EDEI. 
In the abscence of further restrictions on unconditional 
preferences, inequality within each homogeneous subgroup depends on 
the value judgement implied in the choice of a reference type. To avoid 
this, and to expose the incidence of the choice of reference type on the 
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within-group and between-group terms of the ethically relevant partition, 
we may assume that the adjustment procedure for taking into account 
non-income needs is independent of the utility level. Then, in the 
relative case we must assume 
A. BR. c(u, p, a) =f(u, p) g(p, a), 
while in the absolute case 
A. BA. c(u, p, a) =f(u, p) + g(p, a). 
Under A. BR and A. BA, 
where 
.. 110 M MOI1(Jl ) =11[Jlx/d(a , a ),...,Jl /d(a , a)],x 
and 
wy..z) =I mIHm/H]Wy..xm) - ImIHm/H] d"'(am, a~ - Af~\ 
where 
Ay..~") =A.y[~~ -d lt(al, a~, ...,~~- d"'(aM, a°)]. 
Extensions of the SEF's domain by means of weighting schemes which 
allow households to count in proportion to their size, can be easily 
handled in this framework. 
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I 
NOTES 
(1) See, for instance, Amiel and Cowell (1992), Harrison and Seidl 
(1991), and Ballano and Ruiz-Castillo (1994). 
(2) For most purposes in this section we could work with a social 
ordering. However, since for practical applications it is convenient to use 
representable orderings, we assume the existence of a SEF from th.e 
beginning. 
(3) This problem was originally posed by Kondor (1975). 
(4) For the converse question of wheteher a particular inequality 
index implies a unique SEF, see Blackorby and Donaldson (1978, 1980) and 
Ebert (1987). 
(5) The AKS procedure is named after Atkinson (1970), Kolm 
(1976a) and Sen (1973). See also Blackorby and Donaldson (1978). The KBD 
procedure is named after Kolm (1976b) and Blackorby and Donaldson 
(1980). 
(6) Bossert and Pifgsten (1992) have proposed a procedure to obtain 
normatively significant inequality measures that can be conceived as 
convex combinations of these two polar cases. 
(7) This result generalizes those of Blackorby and Donaldson (1978, 
1984) and Ebert (1987) on relative inequality indices, and Blackorby and 
Donaldson (1980) on absolute inequality indices. 
(8) A SEF W is said to be 
i) weakly homothetic if, and only if, for all distributions x and 
x' such that Il(x) = Il(x'), W(x) ~ W(x') <=> W(ax) ~ W(ax') for all a> 0; 
iD weakly translatable if, and only if, for all distributions x 
and	 x' such that Il(x) =Il(x'), W(x) ~ W(x') <=> W(x + AI) ~ W(x' + AI) for all 
HAsuch that (x + AI), (x' + AI)e R+. 
(9) This literature has been recently enriched in Bishop, Formby 
and Thistle (1989) by the application of non-parametric statistical 
procedures for the estimation of the Lorenz curves and related statistics 
used in this approach. 
(10) See, for instance, Blackorby and Donaldson (1978, 1980). 
(11) See, for instance, Blackorby and Donaldson (1982) and 
d'Aspremont (1985). 
3 I 
(12) See, for instance, Muellbauer (1974a), Roberts (1980), and 
Blackorby, Laisney and Schmachtenberg (1992). 
(13) For exceptions, see Muellbauer (1974a, b) and the references 
quoted in Ruiz-Castillo (1993). 
(14) In an alternative interpretation devoid of behavioristic 
features, the fundamental preferences correspond to an agent in charge of 
aggregate evaluations. 
(15) Bourguinon (1989) extends the approach to households that 
maximise the sum of their members' individual utility. A dominance 
criterion is then derived under the only assumptions that household 
indirect utility functions are increasing and concave with income and the 
marginal utili ty of income increases with the index of need. Jenkins and 
Lambert (1992) extend Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987)'5 work to 
situations where the marginal distribution of needs differ. Then a 
distinction can be made between a welfare-improving income distribution 
change and a welfare-improving population composition change. 
(16) So is Ebert (1993)'s attempt at characterising measures of 
relative inequality in the inhomogeneous case. 
(7) See, for instance, the excellent survey by Bergstrom (993). 
(18) Contrast this position with Glewwe (1991)'s discussion of an 
example in which a regressive transfer in unadjusted incomes caused an 
increase in the mean of the adjusted distribution after the transfer, 
altering the relative share of everyone and giving rise to an 
improvement in the inequality of adjusted incomes. The paradoxical 
aspect of this example vanishes if we stick to transfers that preserve the 
total of adjusted incomes, whatever the consequences for the distribution 
of unadjusted incomes. Ebert (993) attempts to work in both spaces in a 
consistent way, rather than concentrating, as we suggest, on equivalent 
incomes space. 
(19) See, for instance, Cowell (980), Shorrocks (1980), or the 
illuminating discussion in Shorrocks (1988). 
(20) This is the weighting scheme recommended by Dazinger and 
Taussig (1979) and Cowell (1984), and used by the present author in Ruiz­
Castillo (1993). 
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